Hamas’ Terror Recruiters Rely on a Mix of Old and New Media
Coded messages on a satellite television station and Facebook are some of the tools that Hamas has been using to plot a series of terrorist atrocities against Israelis.
A recent Hamas terror attempt to launch suicide bombings, stabbings, and shooting attacks against Israel illustrates how the organization combines new and old media to promote death and destruction.
Like hundreds of attacks that Hamas plans every year, Israeli security forces detected and prevented this latest one. But Hamas remains determined to keep looking for new ways to evade Israeli intelligence. This determination led it to use the Gaza-based Al Aqsa satellite television station and Facebook to attract new recruits in the West Bank, who then received instructions on how to go out and kill Israelis.
The recruitment attempts are part of a wider, dangerous strategy by Hamas’ military wing to evade Israeli detection, and send suicide bombers into Israeli cities from the West Bank. They illustrate just how deceptive the everyday quiet on Israeli streets is and how hard Israel’s security forces must work to preserve it.
Israel’s Shin Bet intelligence agency on Wednesday announced the uncovering of a secret Gaza-based Hamas unit dedicated to recruiting Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem for terrorist attacks against Israel.
Dozens of young Palestinians — men and women — communicated with this unit and began planning violence in line with the instructions they received, according to the Shin Bet.
The agency said that it learned of the latest plots and traced them back to the Gazan Hamas unit after questioning several terror operatives under arrest.
One such person, named by the Shin Bet as Kutiba Al-Nuaja, who is from the West Bank town of Yata, was arrested by Israeli security forces in December. During questioning, the Shin Bet learned that Al-Nuaja began communicating on Facebook with a Hamas operative in the Gaza Strip one year ago. It named that handler as Muhammad Arbid.
Al-Nuaja first thought his handler was a journalist, since Arbid’s clothes had the word “press” glued on when he appeared in rioting incidents along the Gaza-Israel border. Arbid connected his new recruit with a second Hamas handler, who presented himself as a member of the organization’s military wing. The second handler encouraged Al-Nuaja to conduct terrorist attacks for Hamas.
To prove that he really was communicating with Hamas’ military wing, his handlers asked him to choose a random verse from the Koran, and then watch a specific show on the Al-Aqsa satellite channel the next day. The host, he was told, would read the relevant passage. The promise came true, and the recruit was reassured.
Al-Nuaja’s handlers told him to conduct a suicide bomb attack on board a bus in the Israeli city of Lod, which is home to both Jews and Arabs. He was arrested days before he was supposed to receive his suicide bomb belt. The Shin Bet’s detection had prevented another mass casualty attack.
A second suspect, Baha Shajiah, also age 21, from the West Bank village of Deir Jariri, was a religious studies student at Al Quds University, east of Jerusalem. Jariri headed a secret Hamas student cell at his campus, and had already served a two-year sentence after being convicted of membership in a Hamas cell that was planning suicide bombing and shooting attacks on Israelis.
In December, he once again found himself in Israeli custody. During questioning, the Shin Bet said that it learned that the suspect had been in contact with a Gazan Hamas operative via Facebook.
Jariri’s handler told him that “people from the Al-Aqsa station are inviting him to be active in Hamas.” The Shin Bet named that recruiter as 24-year-old Musa Alian, from Jabaliya in northern Gaza. Musa identifies himself on social media networks as a journalist.
Hamas used the same recruitment technique with other suspects. They too were lured into terrorist cells with messages from Al-Aqsa TV and Facebook. Using this technique, a Nablus resident was instructed to conduct a stabbing attack in an Israeli community, but was arrested before he could act. Gazan Hamas recruiters told an east Jerusalem man to set up his own terrorist cell and conduct surveillance missions, like photographing busy sites in the Israeli capital.
Hamas’ use of the Al Asqa television station was instrumental in Israel’s decision to bomb its studios in the Gaza Strip on November 12 during an exchange of fire with Hamas. Israel’s intelligence services considered the channel to be a central aspect of Hamas’ recruitment mechanism. The Shin Bet also named two Al Aqsa TV hosts as notable aides in the military wing terrorist messaging system.
But Hamas did not just use the station to pass on coded confirmations to its new recruits. It also used it to incessantly incite Palestinians to violence.
“We must return to [our land] — above ground, underground, by means of demonstrations, bombs, weapons, explosives, explosive belts. … We must return to our land,” Hamas cleric and TV host Iyad Abu Funun declared on the station last April.
In recent years, the station also hosted figures like Hamas’ Deputy of Religious Endowments Abdallah Jarbu, who said, “The Jews are foreign bacteria. … The Quran itself says that they have no parallel. … May he annihilate this filthy people.”
Ultimately, these efforts at fomenting jihadist violence reflect the strategy of Hamas’ leadership, described by a Shin Bet source as undermining “stability in the West Bank at any cost.”
Yaakov Lappin is a military and strategic affairs correspondent. He also conducts research and analysis for defense think tanks, and is the Israel correspondent for IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly. His book The Virtual Caliphate explores the online jihadist presence. This article was originally commissioned by the Investigative Project on Terrorism.