Wikileaks Global Intelligence Files, Israel Day 29: Mossad-Saudi Cooperation
by Lakkana Nanayakkara
Since February 27, 2012, WikiLeaks has continued releasing what it says will eventually be 5 million e-mails sent between July 2004 and late December 2011 from the private intelligence company Stratfor. The emails were obtained from a series of hacking attacks against Stratfor in December 2011, carried out by the online activist collective Anonymous.
An email dated May 2, 2007, states the Mossad is using Cyprus as a “primary transit hub … to assist the Saudi intelligence services with intelligence collection and advice on Iran”. The Saudis are apparently dealing with both the jihadists and the Israelis because they fear that “the U.S. does not have a handle on either.” Several Mossad officers, both past and present, are allegedly “making a bundle” from selling the Saudis security equipment, intelligence and consultation.
An email dated July 18, 2011, refers to a source described as a “Stratfor military source in the region”. The source has a reliability rating of B and a credibility rating of 3 [second highest and average Stratfor ranking respectively].
According to the source, about 3,000 Syrian troops were executed since mid-March 2011 and a similar number arrested “for refusing to open fire on protesters.” Many army defectors have reportedly fled to Turkey, Lebanon and the al-Anbar province in Iraq. The source adds that the likelihood of a military coup is “virtually impossible” because the Alawites and their Druze and Christian allies have completely eliminated Sunnis from “ranking positions.” This email also contained the following statement: “All army units have been placed under firm control by pro-regime military commanders. The chief of staff of the Syrian army Daoud Naf’a, who is Christian, has no control over the army. Naf’a is believed to have entered in a dialogue with U.S. officials and has, thus, become suspect.”
A separate email dated December 15, 2011, refers to two sources described as a “well-connected Syrian political analyst” and a “prominent Syrian opposition activist based out of Beirut.” The sources have a reliability rating and a credibility rating of B to C [second highest to average Stratfor ranking].
According to both sources, army defectors are immediately killed by the regime regardless of sectarian affiliation.
One source said, “… 1200 troops defected yesterday in the north and they included five Alawite officers” and “in Der’a, 20 Alawite officers have defected” since Assad’s ABC interview. The interview was described as “stupid” because it “convinced many Alawite officers that Asad is trying to exonerate himself and implicate his Alawite supporters” and could lead to an Alawite coup against Assad.
The other source said, a military coup could happen in a few weeks if the demands of some Alawite officers are met, including not being persecuted after Assad’s overthrow. A compromise currently being discussed is “surrendering political authority to Sunnis, while Alawites maintain control of the army and Sunnis assume control of the air force.”
In the same email chain, Stratfor employee Reva Bhalla added, “the coup scenario seems most likely in my opinion” and “there are also rumors of the Syrian FM resigning, but a source claims that Bashar refused his resignation for fear of exposing the problems he’s having within the regime.”
An email dated April 12, 2011, mentions a conversation between Stratfor employee Kamran Bokhari and DG-ISI Lt-Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha [Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s intelligence service]. Lt-Gen Pasha said the U.S. seemed to have made the wrong decision to intervene militarily in Libya. He said U.S.-Pakistani relations have not changed much since the release of Raymond Davis [CIA contractor]. He added that issue could have been resolved quietly between the CIA and the ISI but the US State department got involved and turned it into a “diplomatic row and media ruckus.”
Pasha said that “once it became a media issue we were really worried that Davis might be killed by people from within the police service” and there were also “concerns that the Americans could have him killed”.
According to Pasha, the people killed by Davis “were not ISI sleuths” and were “low level thugs who had a lot of cash on them and in different currencies”.
Lt-Gen Pasha predicted it would take “another 10-12 years” to fix the insurgency within Pakistan and it depended on how the U.S. resolved the situation in Afghanistan. He said a military operation should be carried out in North Waziristan province but due to logistics that can only be done after South Waziristan province has been stabilized.
He also said Pakistan does not want the Taliban to dominate Afghanistan but concluded that the Taliban will be part of a future Afghan government after the U.S. leaves Afghanistan.