German Chancellor Angela Merkel addressing a ceremony to mark the 70th anniversary of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. Photo: Bernd von Jutrczenka/Reuters.

It is no secret that relations between Israel and Germany have been deteriorating in the last two decades. The relationship between Benjamin Netanyahu and Angela Merkel was also strained, especially since Merkel claimed that Netanyahu did not keep his word on various issues.

The above was also detrimental to the already strained relationship between the European Union (EU) and Netanyahu’s government. The mistrust that existed between Brussels, Berlin, and Jerusalem mostly stemmed from Netanyahu’s ethno-nationalist hardline, his government’s reluctance to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and large settlement construction.

But relations between Israel and Germany are important, and Merkel was absolutely right to note during a visit to Jerusalem that “it is a mistake to base relations between Israel and Germany only on the memory of the Holocaust.”

So, beyond Holocaust memory per se, what are the benefits to Naftali Bennett’s new government for improving the Israel-German relationship?

First and foremost, improving Israeli-German ties could help lead to a rapprochement between Israel and the European Union. Germany is an important member of the EU, and Chancellor Merkel has often been referred to as the EU’s unofficial leader since the European debt crisis (2009). Germany’s preeminent role in the EU is likely to remain, even after Merkel’s retirement. Improved Israeli-German relations could lead to improved trade and cultural exchanges between Israel and the EU, as well as EU member states.

Netanyahu maintained close ties with populist far-right and anti-liberal Euro-skeptic leaders that are hostile to the EU and Merkel. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is one example. Orbán’s relations with Netanyahu may have strengthened both leaders, but they also may have harmed Israel’s economic and cultural interest with EU members that support European integration, and with Merkel in particular.

Israel’s largest trading partner is the EU, whose bilateral trade accounted for 29.3% of Israeli trade in goods in 2020; 34.4% of Israel’s imports came from the EU, while 21.9% of Israel’s exports went to the EU in 2020.

On the flip side, Israel is a minor trading partner for the EU. In 2019, for example, Israel was ranked as only the EU’s 27th trading partner. Israel would benefit from improving its bilateral trade situation with the EU. Building bridges with Germany’s new government after Merkel leaves office could help achieve that goal.

Second, the dividend of improving relations with the EU and Germany together is twofold, because it would also lead to a reduction in Jerusalem’s dependency on US aid to Israel, as well as improved maneuverability in Washington. The latter builds upon Prime Minister Bennett’s prior efforts to restore the Democratic-Republican bilateral consensus on Israel — a doctrine that was abandoned by Netanyahu during his tenure.

Third, improving relations between Israel, Berlin, and Brussels would demonstrate to the leading members of the EU that Israel remains committed to pluralism and social equality. Even if Bennett has clear right-wing positions, and even if important ministers in his government hold clear right-wing positions, one of the main principles of the Bennett government is the pursuit of gender and social equality. The government has a number of female ministers, as well as Palestinian and Druze ministers. Israel has worked and will continue to work to ensure that its society remains free of racism and discrimination. But these appointments are significant steps that align with the values of liberal democracies, and should be leveraged for diplomatic gains after Netanyahu’s tenure in office.

All in all, the continuation of relations between the parties does not have to be based on a “zero–sum game”: i.e. Bennett’s government’s lack of commitment to the two-state solution does not have to fundamentally impede the relationship between Israel and the EU and Germany. Diplomatic relations have wiggle room, and should be used wisely by Bennett’s government. The steps taken can be gradual and measured, based on Bennett’s pragmatism, the integration of women and Arab minorities in key roles in his government, and shared Israeli-EU interests. As a first step, Bennett’s government should encourage more positive discourse about Germany and the European Union in Israel’s political culture, and work to build a new bridge in the relations with Germany in the post-Merkel era.

Dr. Eldad Ben Aharon is a Lecturer in the department of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Groningen, and Minerva Fellow and Associate Researcher at Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). He is a historian of International Relations specializing in the Cold War in the Middle East. Twitter: @EldadBenAharon