A Saudi flag flutters atop Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul, Turkey October 20, 2018. Photo: REUTERS File Photo

Since arriving in Saudi Arabia five months ago, soccer superstar Ronaldo has scored 14 goals in 16 games for his new club, Al Nassr. Yet, more was needed for Al Nassr to win the Saudi championship or advance in the Saudi Cup.

Even so, Ronaldo’s presence has helped improve the competitive “mentality of the dressing room and the club,” according to former Singapore player Sasi Kumar.

Ronaldo has also significantly enhanced Al Nassr’s following on social media. Tabloid reporting on his luxurious lifestyle, unmarried cohabitation with his partner, Georgina Rodriguez, and Instagram photos of Rodriguez in a bikini help Saudi Arabia project itself as a socially more liberal society, no longer bound by strict Islamic norms.

Saudi Arabia hopes to build on Ronaldo’s initial contribution to attract other superstars who will help propel the Saudi Pro League into the world’s top ten.

Former Real Madrid forward Karim Benzema has signed a deal to join the kingdom’s Al Ittihad football club on a three-year contract.

As part of its effort, the kingdom this week transferred ownership of its four top clubs, including Al Nassr and Al Ittihad, to its sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF). The transfer allows PIF to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in acquiring players and preparing the clubs for privatization.

Ronaldo has a $225 million, three-year contract with Al Nassr. Officials did not disclose Benzema’s salary.

In addition, Saudi Arabia acquired English Premier League club Newcastle United in 2021 for $373 million.

Saudi Arabia’s rationale for boosting sports in general, and particularly soccer, makes perfect sense. Sport is a key pillar of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS)’s effort to diversify the Saudi economy and make it less dependent on oil exports.

The kingdom hopes to increase Saudi Pro League revenues from 455 million Saudi riyals ($121 million) in 2022 to 1.8 billion riyals ($480 million) annually by 2030.

Saudi Arabia further expects its strategy to generate private-sector investment opportunities and increase the market value of the Roshn Saudi League. It also assumes sports will boost tourism, another key pillar of MBS’ economic diversification plan.

In addition, promoting sports has public health significance in a country where more than 50 percent of the population is overweight, and more than 20 percent are obese. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has the Middle East’s second-highest diabetes rate and seventh-highest in the world.

Finally, massive investment in soccer and sports helps Saudi Arabia garner soft power and project itself on the international stage, polish its image that has been tarnished by human rights abuses, and position the kingdom as the region’s top dog, in part by moving the center of sports gravity away from Qatar, which last year hosted the World Cup, and the United Arab Emirates, which fathered Gulf involvement in global soccer with its acquisition of Manchester City in 2008.

The question is not the kingdom’s rationale for emphasizing sports but whether its approach can succeed.

The experience of China might help provide some clues.

China’s lesson is that money alone does not buy sustainable performance or mandatory organic growth, even if a massive investment is geared towards those goals.

China has yet to climb the ranks of FIFA, the sport’s governing body, or emerge as an Asian soccer powerhouse despite investing billions of dollars in tens of thousands of academies and schools offering special soccer education over the last decade, and the acquisition of top foreign players such as Carlos Tevez, Alex Teixeira, and Oscar.

This week’s merger between golf’s PGA Tour, the longstanding organizer of the sport’s flagship events, and LIV Golf, its Saudi-backed 14-tournament league rival, tells a similar story. The merger is as much a tale of the kingdom successfully wielding its financial muscle to gain substantial influence.

Money allowed Saudi Arabia to grease the merger and improve its weak negotiating position. Two years into its existence, LIV Golf signed top players with mouth-watering financial packages but failed to attract corporate sponsors and new star players and garner credible television ratings.

The merger ended the litigation that could have led to LIV Golf being deemed a foreign influence campaign in the United States. This would have meant that its US employees would have to register as foreign agents under the Foreign Agent Registration Act, or FARA.

In another dent in its sports blitz, Saudi Arabia suffered a setback when Egypt withdrew from plans to be part of a joint bid that would also include Greece for hosting the 2030 World Cup.

To secure buy-in from its proposed partners, the kingdom had reportedly agreed to foot Egypt and Greece’s infrastructure and other costs, in exchange for the right to host most 2030 World Cup matches.

Setbacks notwithstanding, Saudi Arabia is set to make a continued splash with its high-profile, well-funded sports initiatives.

All of this will keep the kingdom, already a regional soccer powerhouse, in the limelight.

The question of what the Saudi sports strategy should emphasis is brought into sharp relief by doubts about the kingdom’s ability to fund its grandiose Vision 2030 development plans.

S&P Global Ratings warned this week that “the Saudi banking system alone cannot provide funding to vision 2030, as deposit growth has not kept pace to fund the expansion in loans. They also stated that foreign reserves fell in April to the lowest in more than 13 years, down more than 44% since its 2014 peak.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and scholar, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.