US President Joe Biden walks to board a plane following an Arab summit, at King Abdulaziz International Airprot, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, July 16, 2022. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein

If true, a possible agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia that would involve Saudi-Israeli normalization, would likely be a maneuver designed to strengthen Washington’s global strategic policy. Israel plays a minor consideration in this potential arrangement, but its results could nevertheless challenge the current Israeli government to the point of bringing about its dissolution.

America’s primary considerations are the Chinese and Russian challenges to its already degraded status in the Middle East. In this context, the Biden administration understands that it needs a regional agreement with the Saudis to stabilize the Middle East. Moreover, Washington, as it observes the Chinese infiltration of its alliance with Saudi Arabia, does not want to be drawn into instability in the region.

Under the rumored agreement, Saudi Arabia could formally be recognized as a new and primary member of the Abraham Accords bloc, which is designed to create a check against Iran. An agreement would also create a status quo against Russian penetration, which often goes hand in hand with Chinese infiltration. As far as the US is concerned, this is the ultimate goal of the agreement, and hence Israel itself is not the most important element. But as part of a deal, normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia can also boost American policy in the Middle East.

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement is designed to boost its regional and global status. This follows a Saudi policy of continued dependence on the United States, while at the same time opening channels in the opposite direction, reflecting the lack of Saudi confidence in the US.

Riyadh wants a deal to affirm its place as a prestigious and valuable US ally, in a reversal of the current American attitude to it. The Saudis also want a deal to include a US commitment to a strategic defense alliance, similar to the US commitment to NATO.

As Saudi Arabia looks a decade or two ahead at a changing world, against the backdrop of Iranian provocations, it might also see the deal as an opportunity to gain early nuclear technological knowledge. The Biden administration has not commented on that aspect of any rumored deal.

Saudi Arabia would also receive advanced military technology platforms and capabilities that put it in the first class of powers, and through sales of F-35 and air defense systems, give it capabilities against the Iranian axis. This could also give the Saudis confidence in facing the Houthis in Yemen.

If that happens, Israel will have to deal with the risk of losing regional aerial superiority due to Saudi Arabia acquiring F-35s, and if Saudi starts a nuclear program, this could cause a major erosion of Israel’s qualitative military qualitative edge.

Israel’s involvement will make it easier for Biden to get the deal approved in Congress, where both Democrats and Republicans have raised objections to Saudi Arabia over human rights and extremism, issues that have prevented better US ties with Riyadh.

Regionally speaking, Saudi-Israeli normalization will create a high wall and underground barrier to fortify the Abraham Accords in the coming years, creating a new bloc in the Middle East in the face of the Iranian threat.

Neither Saudi Arabia nor the US are happy about the political situation in Israel, or about the risk of policies that could lead to a multi-arena escalation event. The common interest of the US and Saudi Arabia is regional quiet.

If normalization happens, Saudi Arabia might try to demand significant changes from Israel. As the leading Muslim state, it will not be able to afford to give up the Palestinian issue. Normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia will not be served without Israeli concessions, including an Israeli commitment to a concept that falls within the space of the two-state idea.

In practice, Israel could be required to take steps such as the cessation of annexation of territories for several years in the West Bank, to make land available to the Palestinian Authority in Area C, and to promote Palestinian economic projects. Saudi Arabia may demand a renewed and approved mechanism to keep the Al-Aqsa Mosque quiet as well.

Israel might be required to transfer funds to the Palestinian Authority. It may also be time for Israel to request Saudi financial involvement in the development of infrastructure in the West Bank.

The Saudis can also provide jobs outside of the West Bank to Palestinian tech personnel and academics, some of whom were employed in the Gulf in the past but have returned to unemployment in the West Bank.

Therefore, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have to take critical decisions ahead of his meeting with President Biden in September. Does he want to return to being a legitimate leader on the international stage? If he accepts the terms of normalization, this could speed up the departure of the Ben Gvir-Smotrich alliance from his coalition and the demise of the full right-wing government, leading to the formation of a new government that could deal with these issues in a matter-of-fact manner.

Maj. Gen. Eitan Dangot (IDF, Ret.) is a publishing expert at The MirYam Institute. He concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014.

The MirYam Institute is the leading international forum for Israel focused discussion, dialogue, and debate, focused on campus presentations, engagement with international legislators, and gold-standard trips to the State of Israel. Follow their work at www.MirYamInstitute.org.