US President Donald Trump is interviewed by then-Fox and Friends co-host Pete Hegseth at the White House in Washington, US, April 6, 2017. Photo: REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque

On the night of November 19, 2024, a strike targeted the 1046th Logistics Support Center of the Russian Armed Forces near the city of Karachev in the Bryansk region. The Ukrainian Defense Forces (UDF) used American ATACMS ballistic missiles to carry out this strike, according to media reports.

Washington and Kyiv had not issued any official statements regarding the approval and receipt of such permissions at the time. However, the confirmation of Ukraine receiving the authorization came by November 21.

Another strike followed, targeting a command post near the village of Maryino in the Kursk region. This attack involved at least 10 British subsonic Storm Shadow cruise missiles.

Earlier, media reports suggested that Ukraine had received a “green light” from the US to use long-range missiles, not only for ATACMS but also for Storm Shadow. Even without official statements, it became evident that the reports were accurate — the permissions were granted, and the first strikes on Russian territory had already occurred.

The process of obtaining approval for Ukraine to strike Russian territory was a long and complex diplomatic effort. The Biden administration consistently denied Ukraine this right, citing concerns about escalation. At one point, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin dismissed the idea, with the implausible claim that there were no significant targets worth using ATACMS on within a 300-kilometer radius of Ukraine’s borders.

In reality, there are more than 200 significant targets in that zone, including 16 airfields used by the Russian Aerospace Forces. Striking these targets, according to UDF command, would significantly ease the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine and improve the country’s defensive capabilities. Priorities included ammunition depots, which would disrupt artillery operations; airbases, which would reduce tactical aviation activity; and command centers, which would weaken operational management efficiency.

The strikes in Karachev and Maryino clearly followed this strategic sequence.

Despite the evident benefits of such strikes for Ukraine, the US delayed granting permission, resulting in avoidable losses. Political considerations, rather than military ones, clearly drove the Biden administration’s decision.

From a broader perspective, Ukraine’s military and political leadership operated under the premise that a country facing aggression has the full right to employ all lawful means of defense, including striking enemy territory. When partner nations provide weapons for defense, it should be assumed that these can also be used on the aggressor’s territory. However, for the first time in the history of wars and conflicts, such a restriction was imposed.

This has led to a paradoxical situation where a country receiving weapons for self-defense is constrained in how it can use them. The situation bears resemblance to the Soviet Union’s receipt of Lend-Lease equipment during World War II, and its prohibition from using it beyond its borders.

Thus, using Western-manufactured missiles on Russian territory is a normal practice, while prohibiting their use is an unprecedented anomaly in the history of warfare — one that cannot be explained solely by fears of escalation.

Since 2022, Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that Russia’s so-called “red lines” are ineffective. Strikes, including ones like the attack on the Kremlin, have not led to escalation or fundamentally changed the nature of the war.

Biden’s “Swan Song”?

On the eve of the US presidential elections, there was speculation in Ukrainian political and media circles that granting Ukraine the right to strike Russia might be President Joe Biden’s “swan song” — a final memorable decision in his career. Opponents of this view argued that such permission would only come from the next US president, whether it would have been Donald Trump or Kamala Harris.

This decision was one of those rare foreign policy moves unlikely to provoke significant opposition from either Democrats or Republicans.

Future Prospects Under Trump

It’s possible that Biden’s outgoing administration made this decision as a preemptive measure to counteract fears of a radical shift in US policy on Eastern Europe under Donald Trump. Biden’s move effectively granted Ukraine carte blanche, not just for ATACMS but potentially for other advanced weaponry.

Future plans call for Ukraine to receive US-made AGM-158 cruise missiles and AGM-154 precision-guided bombs. These systems will also require approval for use deep within Russian territory, a decision that would likely fall to the Trump administration. Additionally, Ukraine seeks the ability to shoot down Russian military aircraft in Russian airspace using Western air defense systems and AIM-120C/D AMRAAM missiles for its F-16 fighter jets. These, too, will require US approval, dependent on how effectively Kyiv establishes communication with Trump.

Another key issue will be the continued supply of long-range ATACMS missiles to Ukraine. Trump might aim to appear as effective as Biden — or even more so — in supporting Ukraine.

Biden’s decision has effectively placed Trump in a politically awkward position with limited room to maneuver. Any attempt to block permissions granted by Biden could politically weaken Trump by making him appear less decisive in comparison to his predecessor. For Ukrainian diplomacy, convincing Trump to grant similar permissions for other long-range missile systems will be a challenging yet critical task.

In the near term, it will be difficult for Trump to reverse permissions already granted by Biden without undermining his own political standing. However, Ukraine’s diplomatic corps will face the formidable challenge of persuading Trump to approve the use of additional advanced weaponry expected to arrive in the short term.

Alexander Kovalenko is amilitary-political analyst of the “Information Resistance” group from Odessa, Ukraine. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.