Then-Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, and Cyprus’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Kasoulidis shake hands during a news conference following a meeting, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens, Greece, April 5, 2022. REUTERS/Louiza Vradi

The February 2025 visit to Israel by Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs George Gerapetritis, during which he met with his counterpart Gideon Sa’ar, confirmed the healthy state of bilateral relations between Greece and Israel.

In the most recent UN General Assembly vote of December 19, 2024, when countries were asked to support the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on Israel’s alleged obligations to assist the Palestinians, Greece opted to abstain. (The other EU member states to abstain on this vote were Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. Czechia and Hungary voted against, while all other EU member states voted in favor, including Cyprus.)

Generally speaking, Greece’s stance during the Israel-Hamas war was rather balanced at the UN level — especially after the initial stage of the conflict, during which it displayed a clear pro-Israel attitude.

On September 18, 2024, for instance, Greece supported the UN General Assembly resolution demanding that Israel end its “unlawful presence” in Palestinian territories. (On that vote, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden abstained, whereas Czechia and Hungary voted against.)

Then, on December 12, Greece backed two UN General Assembly resolutions demanding a Gaza ceasefire and the release of hostages, as well as affirming full support for the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). (No EU member state voted against this resolution, but Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, and the Netherlands abstained.)

Throughout 2024, Greece supported Israel’s right to self-defense and condemned Iranian attacks against the Jewish State.

At the same time, Athens focused on the “humanitarian catastrophe” in Gaza and advocated for a two-state solution. Against this backdrop, Greece welcomed both the Israel-Lebanon and the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreements. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2025-2026 period, Greece has expressed its determination to act as a “bridge-builder” by leveraging both its strategic partnership with Israel and its historical friendship with the Palestinians and the Arab world.

Regional turmoil in 2024 did not prevent Israel and Greece from elevating their cooperation. The countries started talks to develop a $2.11 billion anti-aircraft and missile defense system similar to Iron Dome in Greece, and Greece is reportedly also planning to buy PULS rocket launchers made by Israeli company Elbit.

Beyond possible arm deals, the two sides signed an agreement to enhance synergies in the energy sector in December 2024. Energy and Infrastructure Minister Eli Cohen has confirmed Jerusalem’s interest in taking part in the Great Sea Interconnector, a project comprising two underwater electrical cable segments, from Israel to Cyprus and from Cyprus to Greece. This project remains ambitious and expensive, however, with several question marks regarding its practicality.

In the economic sphere, prospects are bright. Trade between the two countries recorded a 41.3% increase in 2024 in comparison to 2023, and volume grew from $920 million to $1.3 billion. In 2024, Israeli exports to Greece totaled $353.4 million, including chemicals (41%), basic metals (25%), plastic products (10%), and electrical machinery (8%). Imports reached $902.8 million, comprising basic metals (42.2%), electrical machinery (15.7%), and chemicals (6.8%). In January 2025, an Israeli trade delegation visited Athens to further reinforce this trend. The delegation was hosted by Israeli Ambassador to Greece Noam Katz, and included the presidents of the Israel’s Manufacturers’ Association and Export Institute.

A possible return to normalcy in the Middle East — difficult as that will be to achieve — would certainly function as a springboard for Israeli-Greek ties in 2025. Tourism flows could gradually go back to pre-October 7 levels. (In times of crisis in 2024, European airlines such as Aegean cancelled flights to Israel for days or weeks at a time.)

Talking to George Gerapetritis a few days ago in Jerusalem, Gideon Sa’ar mentioned that the current security situation could allow the return of athletic events to Israel. During the Israel-Hamas war, Israeli teams were not allowed to play their home games in Israel, but had to play them abroad. The Maccabi Tel Aviv basketball team, for instance, is still playing its home games in Belgrade. Perhaps Athens should have offered hospitality to the Israeli basketball team to demonstrate its solidarity with Israeli athletes and fans. This was a missed opportunity, as Greek spectators love Euroleague basketball and respect Maccabi Tel Aviv.

Looking toward the future, Israel and Greece are expected to intensify consultations with a holistic agenda. New developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, above all in Syria, ought to be part of this. Both countries are carefully monitoring Turkey’s tactics in the Eastern Mediterranean, and its growing footprint in Syria requires meticulous analysis at the bilateral level.

In January 2025, the Nagel Committee warned about Ankara’s ambitions — a central message that cannot be overlooked. The beginning of Donald Trump’s second administration also reignites optimism in an active American involvement in the regional process after a four-year hiatus. Jerusalem and Athens have new opportunities ahead.

Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos is a BESA contributor, a lecturer at the European Institute of Nice (CIFE) and at the Democritus University of Thrace, and a Senior Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.