A satellite image shows un‑buried tunnel entrances at Isfahan nuclear complex, in Isfahan, Iran, Nov. 11, 2024. Photo: Vantor/Handout via REUTERS

Though it might seem counter-intuitive, Israel needs specific enhancements to its strategic deterrence posture. Among other things, these necessary enhancements center on nuclear doctrine and strategy. Most urgently, Jerusalem should plan for an incremental but defined end to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity.”

Why should this argument be taken seriously? Hasn’t Iran’s nuclear potential been degraded or eliminated by Operations “Epic Fury” and “Roaring Lion”? During any future war with Iran, wouldn’t Israel already be in firm position to maintain “escalation dominance?”

Gathering the correct answers is more complex than first meets the eye.

Though a non-nuclear Iran would risk greater harms than would Israel in any future war, the more powerful Jewish State could still suffer the grievous consequences of (1) Iranian CBW (chemical-biological) or radiological attacks; and (2) Iran-spurred operational misunderstandings/policy miscalculations.

Iran could also call upon nuclear allies (most plausibly North Korea) to act as witting nuclear proxies, and on sub-state terror groups to inflict various force-multiplying costs. These groups (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthi) would likely include both Sunni and Shiite surrogates.

For Israel, there will be derivative strategic issues. Prima facie, the direct Israel-American war against Shiite Iran has strengthened some Sunni state adversaries in the region. To wit, now there will be more compelling reason to expect nuclear moves by Turkey, Egypt, and/or Saudi Arabia. Correspondingly, certain predictable actions by China or Pakistan would further undermine Israel’s core national security.

What should Israel do? A comprehensive remedy would include calibrated policy shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” (Amimut in Hebrew) to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Though nuclear ambiguity has managed to “work” thus far, it will not work indefinitely.

At times, strategic truth must emerge through paradox. For Jerusalem, the greatest risk of catastrophic deterrence failure may lie in the prospect of Israeli nuclear threats that are “too destructive.” Oddly but plausibly, nuclear threat credibility could sometime vary inversely with nuclear threat destructiveness.

To be suitably deterred, an enemy state would require continuing assurances that Israel’s nuclear weapons were effectively invulnerable and “penetration-capable.” This second expectation would mean that Israel’s nuclear weapons not only appear protected from adversarial first-strikes, but are also able to “punch through” enemy active defenses.

Adversarial judgments concerning Israel’s ultimate willingness to engage with nuclear weapons would depend on acquiring certain foreknowledge of these weapons and their operational capabilities. Enemy perceptions of mega-destructive, high-yield Israeli nuclear weapons could undermine the credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrent. Bringing a measured end to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity,” on the other hand, would offer a promising corrective for Israel’s ultimate and existential vulnerability. In principle, at least, if an enemy state should ever appear willing to share its nuclear military assets with a surrogate terrorist group, Jerusalem would then need to prepare for nuclear deterrence of sub-state adversaries.

The main point of any shift from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure” would be to signal that Israel’s “bomb” capability lies safely beyond enemy reach and could punish all levels of enemy aggression. By removing the bomb from its metaphoric “basement,” Israel could best enhance its overall strategic deterrence. A properly-calculated end to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” would underscore Israel’s willingness to use measured nuclear forces in reprisal for both first-strike and retaliatory attacks. Also, a defined shift from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure” would best convince Iran or any other non-nuclear enemy state of Israel’s willingness to use calibrated nuclear force against a non–nuclear aggressor.

What about the so-called “Samson Option?” While generally misunderstood, this option could support Israel’s unrelieved task of strategic dissuasion. For Jerusalem, the reinforcing benefits of “Samson” would lie not in any supposed eagerness to “die with the Philistines,” but in its presumptive deterrent advantages. These expected advantages would lie at the “high end” of Israel’s deterrence options and serve any ultimate requirement of “escalation dominance.”

In assessing optimal levels of “selective nuclear disclosure,” Israel ought to continuously bear in mind that the country’s strategic nuclear objective must always be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post. If, however, nuclear weapons should ever be introduced into an escalating conflict with Iran or another enemy state, one form or another of actual nuclear war fighting would ensue. At that chaotic tipping point, Israel’s deterrence objective would need to shift from nuclear war avoidance to nuclear war termination.

Conceptually, if Israel were the only nuclear belligerent in a still-impending conflict, it could find itself in an “asymmetrical nuclear war.” If Israel’s foe were also nuclear, Jerusalem would then be engaged in a “symmetrical nuclear war.” Significantly, even in a “symmetrical” conflict, there would remain detectable inequalities of military power. To best support “escalation dominance” amid such destabilizing inequalities, Israel would benefit from prior policy shifts to “selective nuclear disclosure.” For authoritative decision-makers in Jerusalem, there could be no more important step toward national survival.

Prof. Louis René Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books and scholarly articles dealing with international law, nuclear strategy, nuclear war, and terrorism. In Israel, Prof. Beres was Chair of Project Daniel (PM Sharon). His 12th and latest book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed., 2018). Professor Beres was born in Zurich at the end of World War II.