A man holds an Iranian flag near an anti-US billboard depicting US President Donald Trump and the Strait of Hormuz, in Tehran, Iran, May 30, 2026. Photo: Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS

The Israeli public and many others are looking at the US-Iran memorandum of understanding and seeing a massive, dangerous departure from the previous Witkoff-Kushner diplomatic victory in Gaza. But look closer. The situations are wildly different, but the underlying blueprint is the same: achieve a status change in the short term while the world is paying attention, and then let it play out. Change the reality on the ground, declare a win, and figure out the rest later.

There is something fundamentally “Israeli startup” about the Steve Witkoff- Jared Kushner approach to geopolitics: only deal with what is directly in front of you, fix the bug that can’t wait for tomorrow, and pitch investors on a picture of a future that is wonderful and bright.

What appears like the simple, cynical exercise of kicking the can down the road can, in a more charitable view, be seen as changing elements of an untenable situation to unstick progress. You freeze the conflict, sign the paper, and then allow the new reality to play out a bit, operating on the assumption that this new baseline will eventually create opportunities for all sides to reach a lasting agreement, or not.

To understand the Gaza and Iran deals, you have to understand the man signing them. President Donald Trump often takes action and makes decisions based on personal benefit or the advancement of his historical legacy.

In the Gaza deal, the legacy play was obvious. Delivering the remaining hostages and ending a devastating war that had become deeply unpopular with the global community met the moment perfectly. It secured a headline-grabbing diplomatic triumph that burnished his image as a peacemaker.

Iran, however, was supposed to be different. According to multiple reports, Trump got involved in the military and diplomatic confrontations with Iran because he genuinely believed that regime change was finally within reach. Toppling the Ayatollahs, changing the leadership, and restoring freedom to Iran would have fundamentally remade the Middle East. It would have been the defining, untouchable achievement of his foreign policy legacy.

But wars are unpredictable, and the regional conflict ground to a painful stalemate. Now that the situation remains stuck and regime change is clearly not in the near future, the Trump administration has decided that the time has come to simply change reality. If you can’t secure an unconditional surrender, you pivot to an exit ramp from a costly war.

In the case of the Gaza deal, there was immediate upside for Israel because of the Israeli hostages. It was an intractable, agonizing issue until the Witkoff-Kushner team solved it. The diplomatic promise of an autocratic-run Gaza Strip fueled by international investment wasn’t exactly palatable to Israel, but at least there was something tangible to gain and celebrate.

The Gaza agreement came with lofty promises of an autocratic leadership driving development on the scale of Dubai. Of course, the reality on the ground today is that the IDF is back in control of more than 70% of Gaza, less than a year after that deal was finalized.

But the deal served its unprecedented, short-term purpose.

The leaks and criticism surrounding the current Iran framework from more traditional players — long-entrenched foreign policy hawks like Marco Rubio and Lindsey Graham — reveal a fundamental clash in deal-making philosophy. Traditional diplomats expect both sides to hold up their end of the bargain. If there is a massive $300 billion postwar reconstruction “carrot” on the table, as has been floated in the Iran MoU, they anticipate that the counterparty will actually do what needs to be done to get the money.

The Witkoff-Kushner camp, functioning more like real estate developers than state-craft purists, treats that $300 billion figure like a performance incentive. The staggering number gets Iran to the table to sign a 60-day ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Some people argue Iran won’t actually see this money because it won’t meet the specific demands of the deal — but we don’t know if the conditions on that money are actually part of the agreement. And we’ve also seen Iran successfully manipulate deals like this before, only to get billions in relief without doing what they actually promised.

Unlike the war in Gaza, this specific “change in reality” carries no benefits for Israel.

In this deal, there is no equivalent to the hostages being returned to justify the bitter pill. Instead, the Iranian regime has been elevated. They are now treated as a legitimate state actor worthy of negotiating in fancy hotels in Geneva and Islamabad, rather than a rogue terror sponsor cowering in bunkers.

There is no identifiable, quick win. (In reality, there’s not a quick win for Trump either — since all he did was return the situation to what it was before the war started, with Iran actually having more leverage in the future). And that is why the deal is being resoundingly panned by so many.

President Trump and his party spent years rightfully criticizing the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal, arguing it did not do nearly enough to prevent Iranian nuclear development. They have continuously bashed that deal, suggesting that any transfer of funds, including “an airplane full of cash,” is the undeniable sign of a catastrophic negotiation. Now the headlines suggest that it will take a fleet of military transport planes to carry $300 billion to the Iranian regime that murdered tens of thousands of its own citizens in the streets during the recent protests.

The Witkoff-Kushner approach successfully brought the living hostages home and drew attention away from Gaza. It did not solve any of the underlying issues. In Gaza, that may have been enough. Iran, however, is not Gaza. They are a massive state sponsor of terror, focused on attaining nuclear status, and they have shown both the capability and the appetite to endanger US interests worldwide.

By treating existential geopolitics like a distressed real estate transaction, this approach mistakes a temporary signature for a permanent resolution. They may be successful in changing today’s reality, but tomorrow is coming fast.

David Weissmann is vice president of media strategy at Gova10.