US President Donald Trump greets Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, during a dinner at the White House in Washington, DC, US, Nov. 18, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Tom Brenner TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

The fate of Iran’s nuclear program overshadows another critical nuclear issue in the Middle East: the nuclear cooperation agreement that the Trump administration is negotiating with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).

According to media reports and statements by members of Congress, this deal could leave the door open for Saudi Arabia to pursue a nuclear weapon. That’s a stark departure from other US-signed nuclear cooperation agreements.

The emerging controversy over US-Saudi Arabia nuclear cooperation is a reminder of the continued fallout from the Joint Cooperation Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, which was put in place by the Obama administration.

For America’s allies in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia, the JCPOA only heightened their fears about Iran and its nefarious behavior. Eleven years later, the JCPOA (even in its defunct status) is still unleashing a potentially catastrophic problem in the region that shows no sign of abating.

President Obama broke a campaign promise when he signed the JCPOA in 2015. Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama told prospective voters in 2008 that tough negotiations would incentivize Iran to drop its nuclear program and pursuit of nuclear capabilities.

Instead, the JCPOA officially recognized the program by setting arbitrary standards on enrichment and implementing unproven inspection methods. The much-celebrated agreement set temporary restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activity and did not prevent Iran from collecting nuclear materials.

For Saudi Arabia, temporary restrictions and enrichment levels never mattered. The JCPOA produced a dangerous reality for them and the rest of the Middle East. It validated the nuclear capabilities of an exceptionally hostile and deceptive country. Leading up to the signing of the JCPOA, the Kingdom’s leadership expressed their concerns with the Obama administration and publicly shared their intended response to a signed agreement.

Witness the blunt words of  the former head of Saudi Intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal: “Whatever the Iranians have, we will have, too.”

President Obama believed he could mitigate their fears and thwart the issue of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. During an interview with the Atlantic in 2015 he stated: “The protection that we provide as [the Gulf countries’] partner is a far greater deterrent that they could ever hope to achieve by developing their own nuclear stockpile.” He offered the Saudis a record $115 billion defense package in 2016. He also recognized Saudi security concerns vis-à-vis Iran’s proxy in Yemen — the Houthis. Obama supported the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen by providing US logistical support and intelligence.

But one arms deal does not alleviate fears over the long term, and the Democrats’ commitment to protection became increasingly dubious.

Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden rocked the boat more by calling for the “recalibration” of relations with Saudi Arabia. In 2019, he stated that he would deny the Kingdom weapons sales and “make them [Saudi Arabia] pay the price, and make them in fact the pariah that they are.” President Joe Biden put the Saudi crown prince “on notice,” after declassifying a report from the director of national intelligence linking the crown prince in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. He terminated US support in Yemen. Suffice it to say, Biden’s fist bump with the Saudi Crown Prince in 2022 did little to ameliorate relations.

Despite attempts by Democrats to “reform” the relationship, President Trump, for both of his presidencies, worked to maintain 81 years of relations with the Kingdom. He chose Saudi Arabia as the site of his first overseas visit (during both terms) to demonstrate the importance of the Kingdom in US foreign policy. Trump provided additional arms packages totaling almost $110 billion in 2017 and $142 billion in 2025.

However, prioritizing the relationship and completing massive arms deals (not to mention anti-Saudi behavior from Democrats and some Republicans) have not calmed Saudi fears.

The Kingdom remains fixated on “matching” the nuclear capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

From the Saudi perspective, the Islamic regime in Iran represents an existential threat. The Islamic revolutionaries in Tehran once called for the overthrow of monarchies and allies of America in the Middle East. The Iranian regime foments instability throughout the region by arming and empowering Shia militias like the Houthis, who reside along the Kingdom’s southeastern border.

In the last seven years, the Houthis attacked Saudi oil infrastructure, threatened more attacks, and disrupted maritime traffic in the Red Sea.

Saudi Arabia also claims that Iran interferes in its domestic affairs. Iran is responsible for radicalizing its Shia community through groups like Saudi Hezbollah. In 2016, the Kingdom cut relations with Iran after Iranians attacked its embassy in the wake of the execution of a Shia Saudi religious cleric.

As the last four months have demonstrated, the détente and re-establishment of diplomatic relations under the auspices of China in 2023 were not particularly meaningful.

When the United States assists (of late) with developing a civilian nuclear program in a foreign country, it requires something called the Gold Standard 123 Agreement. The agreement outlines criteria to prevent the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. Among the criteria is the promise that the recipient of US assistance must foreswear enrichment and reprocessing technology — capabilities needed to transform a civilian nuclear program into a military program. Following the illicit nuclear programs in Iraq and North Korea, an additional protocol has been added that allows the IAEA the increased ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material.

According to media reports and some Members of Congress, the Saudis will be exempt from the additional protocol and not denied all pathways to enrich uranium. In response, Democratic Representative Brad Sherman of California stated that “America should be leading the world in preventing nuclear proliferation — not lowering the bar.” He warned: “A Saudi nuclear weapon leads to worldwide proliferation. Egypt and Turkey would feel that they need to match that, and then where’s Argentina and Brazil going to be?”

Representative Sherman’s concerns are warranted, but he is partially to blame for the predicament. He supported the JCPOA knowing full well of its shortcomings and voted to withdraw US support of the Saudi intervention in Yemen. His decisions created the status quo and exacerbated distrust. Had the representative defined his priorities better, his argument would be more credible.

With the state of the Iranian nuclear program unclear, and its future still to be determined, it will be difficult to get Saudi Arabia to forego its objective of matching Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Complicating matters further is President Trump’s June 17 statement on the inability to completely deny ballistic missiles to Iran while other Middle Eastern countries have them. Could his idea of establishing a sense of parity in the Middle East be extended to nuclear enrichment matters?

Forthcoming discussions about a US-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement will once again put the 81-year-old relationship under the microscope and strain. Some members of Congress will question the purpose of relations and portray the Kingdom as more of an obstacle than an ally. Will Congressional opposition (as expressed by Representative Sherman) to Saudi wishes and a Trump-proposed nuclear cooperation agreement push the Kingdom toward China or Russia for help?

What effect does this have on other aspects of relations? Like with Iran, will a less than perfect agreement be better than no agreement at all? Will the international community be required to monitor the enrichment levels of two “civilian” programs? Inevitably, a challenging situation is becoming more difficult and more precarious to contain and manage. The demise of the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot come soon enough.

The praise still heaped on the Obama administration for signing the JCPOA is quite remarkable. Congress never ratified the agreement as a treaty. Of its several shortcomings, the Iran nuclear deal failed to effectively address the proliferation of nuclear capabilities in the region. That shortcoming is witnessed in the growing controversy and contention over a reported US-Saudi Arabia nuclear cooperation agreement. It is further proof that the JCPOA, eleven years later, keeps creating problems.

Eric Bordenkircher, Ph.D., is a research fellow at UCLA’s Center for Middle East Development. He tweets at @UCLA_Eagle. The views represented in this piece are his own and do not necessarily represent the position of UCLA or the Center for Middle East Development.