Families and supporters react as they celebrate the release of Omer Wenkert, a hostage who was held in Gaza since the deadly October 7, 2023 attack, on the day of the release of six hostages from captivity in Gaza as part of a hostages-prisoners swap and a ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel, in Gedera, Israel February 22, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Rami Shlush

In negotiating the release of about 250 hostages, both living and dead, Israel has prioritized children, women, the aged, and the ill or injured. The prioritization was roughly in that order. Lowest on the list are younger men, and especially those without pre-existing medical conditions and who were not known to be injured on October 7, 2023.

Many people will assume that these are exactly the right priorities. However, there are good reasons for thinking that the matter is much more complicated. This is because every category of hostage is at greater relative risk of some serious harm. The challenge is to decide how to convert these different risk profiles into policy.

Among the reasons for prioritizing children, two main ones stick out. First, barring their captivity, they have the longest remaining life-expectancy, and thus more life-years can be saved by saving them. Second, they are among the least able to cope with captivity, which threatens them both in the moment but also their developmental needs.

There are also reasons for prioritizing women, and especially younger ones. They are arguably at greater risk of sexual assault. There have been reports of male hostages being subjected to such assault, and we still do not yet know the relative risk between the sexes.

While both sexes can be raped, younger females could also become pregnant as a result. The risks and horrors of enduring such a pregnancy and possible consequences are significant.

One reason for prioritizing the aged is that, like children, albeit in different ways, they are less able to cope with the physical assault of captivity conditions. However, there is also a reason to deprioritize older captives. Because their remaining life-expectancy is shorter, fewer life-years are saved.

Like the aged, the ill and injured can have added challenges in enduring and surviving captivity. The severity of the illness or injury affects the degree to which this is true.

These considerations are likely what informed the decisions about which hostages should be released first. However, we should not lose sight of the special risk profile of (younger) men, especially given that even some of the dead have been prioritized over them.

There is ample evidence that there are fewer psycho-social barriers to the infliction of (non-sexual) violence, including death, on males. Indeed, that is exactly why (young) men are so instinctually deprioritized in hostage releases. They may be at less risk in some ways but, as males, they are at more risk in other ways. This has already been acknowledged by one of the recently released young female soldiers, who said “We, the girls, suffered. But the boys and men suffered even more.” Further preliminary evidence is that, of the released hostages, the emaciated ones have been disproportionately male.

Sometimes the deprioritizing of younger males is thought to be justified by their being (combat) soldiers or at least of military age. Even when this is not a direct factor, it can be an indirect one. For example, it might be said that Hamas would be much less likely to release young males first. However, the fact that younger men are disproportionately combat soldiers, or seen to be so, is itself partly the result of a lesser valuing of male lives, and thus further evidence of the special risks faced by young men. Almost all the post-October 7 combat deaths have been male.

Weighing up the different risk profiles in decisions about whom to prioritize for release is an impossibly difficult and tragic choice. The matter is made even more complicated by other considerations, such as the expected timeline for the release of the final hostages.

The shorter the expected period between the initial releases and the final ones, the stronger the case for prioritizing those in more immediate danger. However, if the release of the final hostages is so far in the future that even the fittest young men are unlikely to survive, then the case for prioritizing the aged, for example, becomes weaker.

Obviously, any individual hostage’s risk profile is not determined only by their group characteristics. It can depend on which terror group is holding them, where they are held, whether the Israel Defense Forces is able to rescue them (without mistaking them for terrorists), and innumerable other circumstantial conditions and coincidences. Because these factors are even more unknown, there is less reason to consider them in developing a policy.

There has been some talk of the current policy favoring “humanitarian” cases. That is certainly a mischaracterization. Every hostage is a humanitarian case. (In the case of dead hostages, the main humanitarian considerations are their families’ interests in the return and proper burial of their remains.)

At the end of the first phase of the January-February 2025 hostage and prisoner release agreement, approximately 27 living, and 32 dead, hostages remain in Gaza. They have been left until last. Some of the dead might not have survived precisely for that reason. For the others, we must hope that being left until last does not also mean that they will not last until they can be released.

David Benatar is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town and currently Visiting Professor at the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto.