Protesters, mainly Houthi supporters, stand near a screen displaying senior Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya during a rally to show support to Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, in Sanaa, Yemen, Oct. 18, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah

The Houthi rebels have spent years crafting an image of themselves as a hardened, battle-tested force capable of standing up to the most powerful militaries in the region. Now, in the midst of heightened tensions in the Red Sea and ongoing attacks on commercial shipping, they’ve extended that illusion to the United States. Emboldened by years of asymmetric victories against Saudi Arabia, bolstered by Iranian weaponry, and legitimized by propaganda that casts them as the spearhead of a broader “resistance” movement, the Houthis have convinced themselves — and their supporters — that they are capable of not just resisting US military pressure, but prevailing against it.

This belief is a dangerous miscalculation.

Their confidence stems, in part, from real battlefield experience. For nearly a decade, the Houthis have survived and even thrived despite relentless airstrikes, economic blockades, and shifting coalitions aligned against them. Saudi Arabia, with its modern air force and US-supplied munitions, failed to achieve decisive victory, and the perception within Houthi circles is that American power will be no more effective. Their propaganda machine amplifies every moment of defiance — a ship that reroutes, a drone that gets through, a Western strike that doesn’t dismantle their network — and translates it into a narrative of victory. To them, every surviving radar station is proof that the empire can bleed.

But the United States is not Saudi Arabia. The comparison reflects not just poor military judgment, but a profound misunderstanding of American strategic capacity and intent. Unlike regional actors, the US is not burdened by the political minefields of sectarian loyalties, tribal politics, or proximity. It can strike from the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden, or from submarines under the Red Sea. It does not need to occupy territory to destroy critical infrastructure. And when Washington decides that a threat must be neutralized, it tends to play a long game — using precision, partnerships, and pressure points until that threat is either dismantled or buried under economic and military consequences.

The Houthis lack the strategic depth to survive this kind of prolonged targeting. They are not a state with layered defenses, they are a militia with a territory — and that territory, while difficult to fully conquer, is not indestructible. Their command centers, storage depots, and drone assembly lines can only be relocated so many times. A concentrated American campaign, especially if paired with increased maritime interdiction and regional intelligence sharing, would gradually degrade the very tools that have made Houthi escalation possible. Their coastal control gives them influence over shipping routes, but also makes them highly visible. Their reliance on external supply chains — from Iran through smuggling routes and covert logistics — exposes them to disruption and surveillance. The longer they play this game, the more they risk pulling the US into a sustained campaign that their organization is not structurally prepared to endure.

Yet the illusion persists — and may even intensify. Faced with growing losses, the Houthis are likely to lean further into psychological warfare. Propaganda will surge. They will publish shaky videos of “downed” drones, stage missile launches, and portray every Western casualty, real or fabricated, as a blow against imperialism. Their goal is not battlefield victory but narrative control. If they can’t defeat the US militarily, they’ll try to erode its political will through a war of images, slogans, and social media virality. In doing so, they hope to sway anti-interventionist voices in the West and rally populist support across the Arab world.

Meanwhile, Iran will tighten its grip. The deeper the Houthis get, the more reliant they become on Tehran’s support — not just for weapons, but for expertise. We may see the quiet transfer of more sophisticated drone systems, longer-range missiles, and even the arrival of Iranian advisers on the ground to coordinate more complex attacks. Tehran has every interest in keeping US forces tied up in Yemen and distracted from other fronts like Syria or the Gulf. But that support will come at a cost: it will make the Houthis more vulnerable to becoming a direct target of Western-Iranian proxy escalation.

All of this is moving toward a dangerous inflection point. The Houthis are pushing the boundaries of what they can get away with — harassing ships in a key global chokepoint, attacking US assets, and daring the world’s most powerful navy to respond. Eventually, that response will escalate in ways they cannot control. A more aggressive US posture, especially in coordination with allies like the UK and France, could impose a maritime siege, take out port infrastructure, or even strike symbolic leadership targets. If the Houthis attempt to retaliate by mining the Bab el-Mandeb Strait or attacking Western vessels more directly, they may trigger a regional conflagration that leaves northern Yemen not as a “liberated” zone but a ruin.

This is why the illusion matters. The Houthis are not just overestimating their strength — they are gambling with the future of their movement and the lives of millions under their control. Their strategic calculus is shaped more by ideology and self-delusion than by sober assessments of military reality. The longer they cling to this fantasy of victory, the closer they come to waking up to its catastrophic consequences.

Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx