The Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor in Iran. Photo: Nanking2012 / WikiCommons.

There are those who believe that given the sweeping turmoil in the Middle East, the two most powerful non-Arab countries other than Turkey – Israel and Iran – have common interests in forming a strategic alliance that would substantially strengthen their position and contribute to regional stability. They argue that such an alliance would create a new balance of power and set the stage for a new geopolitical development from which both countries could mutually benefit.

They base this argument on a number of assumptions including the long, friendly, and mutually cooperative relationship that Jews and Persians enjoyed for centuries, which continued until the 1979 revolution. According to this theory, the countries have no conflict of interest as Iran’s ambitions to become the region’s hegemon presumably has no bearing on Israel and the two countries can benefit greatly from each other’s abundance of human and natural resources.

These proponents further argue that the enmity between Iran and Israel is transient and circumstantial, pointing to the fact that Israel supplied Iran with weapons and munitions during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, and that with the typical shifting of the political winds in the Middle East, the two countries could resume their cooperation.

The supporters of this notion further suggest that since the Arab Sunni states will never see eye-to-eye with Iran and in principle reject Israel as an integral part of the predominantly Arab region, Israel and Iran would gravitate toward each other and seek a close alliance to counter the adversarial Arab stance.

The API represents a sea change, and even though Israel did not act on the Initiative, the premise of the API remains as valid today as it was when it was initially presented. The simultaneous growing tension between the Arab Sunni states (led by Saudi Arabia) and Iran in the wake of the Iraq war, Syria’s civil war, and the intense animosity between Israel and the Iranian regime, brought the Arab states and Israel closer to each other than at any time before.

Certainly the adage “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” does play a role, but now both sides understand the enormous mutual benefits they can derive from normal relations. Many Arab states already have clandestine trade relations with Israel as well as cooperation in intelligence-sharing to combat terrorism. There may be certain gains for Iran to play Israel against the Arab states; there is no gain for Israel to ally itself with Iran. Israel also understands that time has changed and with that, Israel’s national interest has also shifted. It is surrounded by Arab states, with which Israel must coexist peacefully and collaboratively if it wishes to ensure its long-term security and economic development.

The fact that Israel supplied weapons to Iran during the Iraq-Iran War was done at the behest of the U.S. and was a part of a calculated strategy by the Reagan administration to supply both combatants with weapons. As former CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operation Ed Juchniewicz put it, “We did not want either side to have the advantage. We just wanted them to kick the shit out of each other.”

Future Uncertainty:

As a result, Israel cannot, and most likely will not, simply trade prospective peace with the Arab states, and by extension with the entire Sunni Muslim world, for the uncertainty of future relations with Iran. Iran is primarily motivated by its desire to become the dominant power in the region and will attempt to do so by forging an anti-Arab Sunni coalition. Israel cannot be part of an anti-Arab grouping because its national interests do not align with Iran’s ambitions and nuclear designs.

Finally, for the Arab states, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons poses the most dangerous challenge, and they view Israel as the only regional power that shares their fear and can prevent Iran from achieving its goal. This common concern is likely to accelerate the peace process, and once peace is established, however long that might take, Israel will have no reason to switch alliances regardless of the ultimate fate of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

The question is, will there be any circumstance under which Israel and Iran could normalize their relations? The answer is yes. But before that can happen, there must be a regime change in Iran and a peaceful solution to Iran’s nuclear program that, to Israel’s satisfaction, will bind any succeeding government in Tehran. Even then, Israel’s greater interest lies with the Arab states, and as long as the violent conflict between the Sunnis, led by Saudi Arabia, and the Shiites, led by Iran, continues, the emergence of an Israeli-Iranian axis remains illusionary at best. It should be further noted that the regional geopolitical conditions have changed, and Iran itself is the culprit behind some of these changes, which will be hard to reverse.

Iran must now cope with the new reality, which may well explain why Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons and why its efforts in this regard will set Israel further apart from Tehran, rather than bring them together to form an unholy axis.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies. Website: www.alonben-meir.com