Russia’s President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with China’s Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission Wang Yi during a meeting in Moscow, Russia February 22, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Anton Novoderezhkin/Pool via REUTERS

The sigh of relief in a swath of land stretching from China to Africa’s Atlantic coast was audible when Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch who heads the Wagner Group, a state-funded private military company, called off his mutiny against President Vladimir Putin’s military and security establishment.

Russian military personnel surrendered without a fight when Prigozhin took control of Rostov-on-Don, a city of one million people and home to the headquarters of Russia’s Southern Military District, widely viewed as one of the military’s most competent units. Similarly, Wagner fighters advanced along the M4 expressway to within 200 kilometres of Moscow, with no attempt by the military to stop them.

The question marks about the situation are compounded by reports that General Sergei Surovikin, the former top Russian military commander in Ukraine, knew in advance of Prigozhin’s planned revolt.Another senior military officer, Lt. Gen. Vladimir Alekseyev, appeared on video, chatting with Prighozin after the Rostov-on-Don takeover.

To be sure, Surovikin and Aleseyev issued separate videos criticizing Prigozhin and calling on him to halt his revolt. In addition, Putin sent a brigade loyal to Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov rather than a Russian military unit to Rostov-on-Don to confront the Wagner Group. Even though it did not come to a clash, the Russian leadership is likely to see the mutiny as an opportunity to replace the Wagner Group.

The Wagner revolt — and questions about Putin’s grip on power — have diminished Russia’s status as a credible security partner, which had already been called into question by its inability to subjugate Ukraine.

In addition, Putin’s foreign friends in China, Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa have long felt uneasy about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, even if they were not condemning it publicly or adhering to sanctions imposed by the United States, Europe, and others.

Except for China, mediation proposals by African leaders, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett were primarily intended to demonstrate neutrality in the Ukraine conflict.

So was China’s plan, but China plays in a different league because many view it as the only power with real influence in Moscow. In Central Asia, China has sought to capitalize on Russia’s diminished status, where Russia was long seen as the region’s security guarantor, and US neglect of the former Soviet republics. In May, President Xi Jinping unveiled a grand development plan focused on infrastructure and trade at a meeting in Beijing with the leaders of the five Central Asian states.

Rather than wanting to replace Russia, China hopes to emerge as the dominant power in the region with Russia as its junior partner.

If Ukraine wasn’t enough of a headache, uncertainty about Putin’s status is compounded by a lack of clarity about the future of the Wagner Group, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, where the Russian company may be first among equals, but Chinese and other private military companies also operate.

Russia’s defense ministry may be able to control the group in Ukraine and Syria, but could find subjugating Wagner more difficult in Africa. In contrast to Ukraine and Syria, countries with a strong Russian military presence, Russia has far fewer, if any, forces in the African nations where Wagner operates. Media reports said an unknown drone had attacked a Wagner base in Libya south of the rebel-held city of Benghazi days after the mutiny. Wagner positions in Syria were reportedly raided by Russian troops, detaining commanders of the group.

Nevertheless, Wagner, acting independently, could be a concern for Chinese private military companies on the African continent. In contrast to Wagner, which effectively operates as a mercenary and combat force, Chinese companies, like Beijing DeWe Security Service, Huaxin Zhong An Security Group, and China Security Technology Group, serve primarily as protectors of Chinese investments, assets, and personnel. As a result, they have little contact with Wagner.

Mali could emerge as a test case of what Wagner’s post-revolt positioning could mean for Chinese companies. Mali has expelled United Nations peacekeepers scheduled to withdraw from the country before the end of this year, relying instead on Wagner. Moreover, Russia’s experience with Wagner raises the specter of military forces revolting against ruling elites when many in China, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa believe that the era of popular revolts has run out of steam.

That may not be an immediate domestic concern in China, but it is a worry given China’s preference for stability in countries across Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa, with which it maintains close economic and other ties.

For now, China, like others, sighs in relief. However, the last word on the Wagner mutiny fallout has yet to be spoken.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and scholar, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.